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1.  Introduction 
  One of the longstanding questions in economics is why some countries are so much 
richer than others.  Today, for example, income per capita in the world’s richest countries 
is roughly thirty-five times greater than it is in the world’s poorest countries.  Recent 
efforts aimed at understanding current international income differences (e.g., Lucas 2001, 
and Ngai 1999) argues that the proximate cause of the disparity is that today’s poor 
countries began the process of industrialization much later than today’s rich countries, 
and that this process is rather slow.    
     A basic development fact is that countries experience a structural transformation as 
they develop. The rich countries of the world currently have less than 10 percent of their 
workforce in agriculture, while for many of the world’s poorest countries this figure 
exceeds 60 percent.  However, this is roughly the employment share that existed two 
centuries ago in today’s rich countries.   In this paper we argue that a simple model of 
this process of structural transformation provides a useful theory both of why 
industrialization occurs at different dates, and why once underway the process occurs 
slowly. A key implication of our analysis is that a greater understanding of the 
determinants of agricultural productivity is key to building models that can better 
confront the issues facing many of today’s developing nations.  
  Our model builds on Gollin et al. (2002), (henceforth, GPR).  That model is an 
extension of the standard neoclassical growth model that includes an agriculture sector 
and in which individuals face subsistence food requirements. A key feature of that model 
is that resources cannot move out of agriculture unless the subsistence needs of the 
population are met.  It follows that the pace of industrialization depends on developments  2 
in the agricultural sector.
1  Factors that lead to low agricultural productivity can, 
therefore, delay a country’s development. Consequently, technological innovations (e.g., 
the Green Revolution), institutional changes (e.g., land reforms), or even policy changes 
(e.g., tax or regulatory changes) that lead to increases in agricultural productivity will 
affect the pace of industrialization and hence the time series of the cross-country income 
distribution.  This is the case even though the productivity of the agricultural sector is 
irrelevant for the asymptotic distribution of international incomes. Asymptotically, this 
distribution is determined entirely by the distribution of policies and institutions in each 
country that affect productivity in the nonagricultural sector. 
  The main difference between the model considered in this paper and in GPR is that 
here we allow for a feedback from the non-agriculture sector to the agriculture sector.  
There was no such feedback in GPR because that model abstracted from capital and land 
inputs in the agricultural technology.  In this paper we allow for such a feedback from 
non-agriculture to agriculture by assuming that capital produced in the non-agriculture 
sector can be used in agriculture.   The introduction of this feedback implies a much 
richer set of predictions relative to GPR. (2002).     The main differences in findings are 
as follows: 
•  Although the date at which an economy starts to industrialize is again 
determined exclusively by agricultural TFP, the differences in agricultural 
TFP that are needed to delay the industrialization process for two centuries 
are much smaller compared to GPR. 
                                                 
1 This observation is emphasized in an older strand of the development literature. See, for example, Schultz 
(1964), and Johnston and Mellor (1961), who argued that productivity improvements in agriculture are a 
precondition for an economy to industrialize.  3 
•  The rate of structural transformation now depends importantly on the non-
agricultural policy.    
•  A poor country that has started to industrialize can undergo a growth miracle 
either by improving agricultural policy or improving non-agricultural policy.   
Development economists have long emphasized the role of agriculture in the 
development process.
2 Macroeconomists have only recently begun to emphasize its role. 
Caselli and Coleman (2001) argued that explicit modeling of the structural transformation 
is central to understanding the evolution of relative incomes across regions in the United 
States. Several others have also analyzed models of the structural transformation that 
explicitly incorporate an agricultural sector. These include Echevarria (1995, 1997), 
Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (1998), Laitner (1998), Glomm (1992), Matsuyama (1992), 
and Goodfriend and McDermott (1995). While our model shares several features with 
these other papers, none of them use their models to explore the evolution of cross-
country income differences over time. 
 
 
2.  A Model of Structural Transformation 
2.1 The Economy 
Our model is an adaptation of those of Laitner (1998) and Hansen and Prescott 
(forthcoming).  The basic structure of our model is that of the one-sector neoclassical 
growth model extended to allow for an explicit agricultural sector in addition to the usual 
                                                 
2 The contributions are far too numerous to include an exhaustive list, but important references include 
Johnston and Mellor (1961), Fei and Ranis (1964), Schultz (1964), Lewis (1965), Kuznets (1966), Chenery  4 
non-agricultural sector.   The extension is done in such a way that the process of 
development is associated with a structural transformation of economic activity, 
characterized by a declining share of economic activity accounted for by the agriculture.  
Asymptotically, agriculture’s share of the labor force shrinks to zero, and the model 
becomes identical to the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model.
3   
   Economies are treated as being closed. Hence, each economy is required to produce 
its own food. This assumption precludes a poor country that is relatively unproductive at 
producing food from simply importing it, a restriction that can be significant for some 
specifications of our model.  However, this assumption is not particularly at odds with the 
data--the evidence is that imports of basic foodstuffs tend to be quite small in developing 
countries.
4   
  
Preferences 
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived representative family.  Instantaneous 
utility is defined over two consumption goods: a non-agricultural good denoted by ct, and 
an agricultural good denoted by at. To account for the secular decline in agriculture’s 
share of economic activity we follow the convention of assuming a utility function of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Syrquin (1975), Johnston and Kilby (1975), Hayami and Ruttan (1985), Mellor (1986), Timmer (1988), 
and Syrquin (1988). 
3 In reality it may be that although agriculture’s share of economic activity becomes small, it remains 
bounded away from zero. This would not matter at all for our analysis. 
4 We do not model why a country that would benefit from food imports chooses not to do so. While this 
may reflect trade barriers, it may also reflect the lack of sufficient infrastructure to feasibly deliver food to 
rural areas.  5 
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Lifetime utility is given by:  
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where β  is the subjective time discount factor.  
  These preferences imply that a family will never consume the agricultural good 
beyond  a no matter how cheap agricultural goods may be relative to nonagricultural 
goods.  In equilibrium this will imply that once output in the agricultural sector reaches 
a, all remaining labor will flow out of agriculture regardless of the state of the non-
agricultural sector. More generally, one might expect that a very low level of relative 
productivity in the non-agriculture sector might cause more labor to be allocated to 
agricultural production as consumers shift their consumptions bundles toward agricultural 
goods. This is potentially an important effect and one that we focused on in Gollin, 
Parente and Rogerson (2000). We abstract from it here, not because we believe it is 
insignificant, but rather because we want to focus attention on feedback effects going in 
the other direction, i.e., how the state of the agricultural sector affects the labor available 
for the manufacturing sector. 
 
                                                 
5 Technically we should assume that a family has a very small endowment of the nonagricultural good that 
is always consumed to avoid the issue that instantaneous utility is lowered when c increases from zero to a 
small positive amount. We ignore this for simplicity.   6 
Endowments 
The representative family is endowed with one unit of time each period.  Additionally, 
the family is endowed with the economy’s stock of land denoted by L, which is 
normalized to 1.  Land does not depreciate in the model.   The family is not endowed 




Following the tradition in the literature, we refer to the nonagricultural sector as the 
manufacturing sector, though in fact it is meant to capture the full range of activities in 
the nonagricultural sector.  For this reason we use the subscript, m, to refer to non-
agricultural variables.  The nonagricultural sector produces output (Yt) using capital (Kmt) 
and labor (Nmt) as inputs according to the following constant returns to scale technology: 




m m t N N K E Y ε γ
θ θ + + =
− .                                      (3) 
In equation (3), Em is a total factor productivity parameter, and γ m is the constant 
exogenous rate of technological change.
6 This technology is standard except for the term 
ε Nmt. This term is added to the production function so that an economy with no physical 
capital can start manufacturing and accumulate capital. In the numerical work that 
follows we will pick  ε  to be a small number.
7    
                                                 
6 We abstract from issues such as embodiment of technology and appropriate technology. 
7 Alternatively, we could have assumed that all countries are naturally endowed with a very small amount 
of capital that is always available. This would not affect our results at all.  7 
  The TFP parameter, Em, is assumed to be country-specific, being determined by 
policies and institutions that impact on activity in the non-agriculture sector.
8  It can be 
interpreted as the fraction of the exogenous stock of knowledge in the world that a 
country would use, given its institutions, were it to produce the non-agricultural good. In 
contrast, the parameters γ m and ε  are identical across countries. To be sure, the growth 
rate of productive knowledge has not been constant through history. The assumption of a 
constant rate of technological change, however, is not critical to the results we establish 
in this paper.  Additionally, much of the stock of useful knowledge owes its creation to 
research and development in the rich countries.  Poor countries, however, are generally 
not in the business of creating ideas, and so from their perspective, the assumption of 
exogenous technological change is reasonable.  
  Output from the manufacturing sector can be used for consumption or to augment the 
capital stock. The non-agriculture resource constraint is thus,  
          ct + xt ≤  Yt,,                                                        (4) 
and the law of motion for the stock of capital in the economy is 
t t t k k k + − = + ) 1 ( 1 δ .                                                    (5) 
Agriculture 
We distinguish between three technologies to produce the agricultural good. The first of 
these, which is indexed by 0, corresponds to a traditional technology.  The key features of 
this technology are that it is not subject to exogenous technological change and it is not 
affected by policy.  The inputs to the traditional technology are labor services (N0t) and 
                                                 
8 See Parente and Prescott (2000) for an explicit discussion of a mapping from policies into the level of 
TFP at the aggregate level. Certainly, an important issue in this literature is to identify those policies and 
institutions that are most responsible for generating cross-country differences in TFP. While we believe this  8 
land services (L0t).  The amount of output produced from the traditional technology (A0t) 
is given by  
α α − =
1
0 0 0 t t t L N A                                                           (6) 
We assume that when all of the economy’s labor and land are employed in the traditional 
technology the economy produces a units of the agricultural good.  Given our 
normalization of the family’s endowments of time and land, this assumption implies 
1 = a . There is nothing particularly special about this normalization.  Our results would 
not be much affected by alternatively introducing a TFP parameter to the traditional 
technology and using a different value for a.
9  
  The other two agricultural technologies, indexed by the numbers 1 and 2, are both 
subject to exogenous technological change and policy.  The key difference between them 
is that technology 2 uses land, labor, and capital produced in the manufacturing sector 
whereas technology 1 uses only land and labor.  Agricultural output from technology 1 
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whereas agricultural output produced using technology 2 (A2t) is given by  
µ φ ϕ φ γ
− − + =
1
2 2 2 2 2 ) 1 ( t t t
t
a t L N K E A .                                                       (8) 
In equations (7) and (8), Ea is a total factor productivity parameter, which is country-
specific. As was the case with the manufacturing technology, one source of cross-country 
differences in this parameter is policies and or institutional features that impact on 
                                                                                                                                                 
remains an important issue in this literature, it is not central to our purpose, and hence we feel the reduced 
form approach makes our analysis more transparent.  9 
agricultural activity. However, another very important source of variation is differences 
in the amount or quality of land per person, and climate.  In particular, technological 
innovations that are useful for a specific crop in a given climate may not be particularly 
relevant for other crops in other parts of the world, thus generating large differences in 
cross-country productivity levels that are independent of policy.    
 The  parameter,  γ a, denotes the rate of exogenous technological change in the modern 
agricultural technology. Though it is easy to imagine circumstances in which because 
technological innovations are not applicable in all countries, growth rates of technology 
may differ across countries, for the purposes of our analysis here, we assume that this 
value is common to all countries.  
  There are several reasons why we use two  “modern” agricultural technologies rather 
than one. The first reason is purely technical.  We need to allow for some mechanism by 
which the structural transformation can begin.  If the agricultural technology given by 
equation (7) did not exist, no economy would ever be able to move resources out of 
agriculture and grow.  Second, as the Green Revolution has shown, important increases in 
output have been realized without significant inputs produced by the manufacturing 
sector.  As the green revolution has shown, large increases in rice harvests followed the 
introduction of new seed varieties even though farmers continued to use animal power.  
This belies what we view as the key feature that separates these two technologies: 
namely, whether production is dependent on animal power or machine power.   
                                                                                                                                                 
9 We note that there are reasons to believe that a value close to a is appropriate. Models in which fertility is 
endogenous suggest that output per capita will be close to subsistence levels for economies that have not 
begun the process of industrialization.  10 
  Output from the agriculture sector can only be used for consumption purposes.  The 





it t A a .   The assumption 
we make on the economy imply that the traditional technology will not if either of the 
modern technologies is used.  
 
2.2 Solving for Equilibrium 
We focus on the competitive equilibrium for this economy. Our primary interest is in 
how different values of the technology parameters Ea and Em affect the resulting dynamic 
allocations generated by the competitive equilibrium. Solving the competitive 
equilibrium is fairly straightforward.  As long as Ea(1+γ 1)
t  <  1, an economy will 
specialize in agriculture using the traditional technology in order to meet its subsistence 
needs.  The economy will switch into agricultural technology 1 in the first period for 
which Ea(1+γ 1)
t ≥  1, and will begin manufacturing in the first period in which Ea(1+γ 1)
t >  
1.  Denote the first period in which the economy can move resources into manufacturing 
by T.  The competitive equilibrium allocations solve the following planner’s problem 
starting with T 
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The maximization is over the sequence of choices 
∞
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Let the numeraire for the economy be the agricultural good.  Prices can be determined as 
follows.  First, the rental prices of land and labor are just the marginal physical products 
from the agricultural technology that is used.  Second the price of the consumption good 
can be determined by using the marginal physical product of labor from agriculture with 
the marginal physical product of labor from manufacturing.     If agricultural technology 
is used, then its rental price of capital is the marginal physical product from agricultural 
technology 2 provided that technology is used in the period.  Otherwise, all capital is 
used in manufacturing so that the rental price of capital is just the price of the 
consumption good times the marginal physical capital evaluated at the optimal 
allocations. 
  Computationally, we exploit the fact that in the limit the economy converges to the 
one-sector neoclassical growth model.  We employ a shooting algorithm in which only a 
guess for the value for kT+1 is needed to compute the entire path of allocations for the 
economy from t=T to t=T+350.  As part of this algorithm, we determine for any kt the 
optimal allocations of capital, labor and land service inputs for all technologies 
 
 
3. Numerical  Experiments 
3.1 Benchmark Parameterization  12 
In this section we report some numerical results that serve to illustrate our main findings. 
We begin by providing a benchmark specification that loosely captures the development 
of the United Kingdom over the last 250 years.  We choose the length of a time period to 
be one year. Without loss of generality the value of Em is normalized to one for the UK. 
Asymptotically, the growth rate of (per capita) output in this economy will be equal to 
(1+γ m)
1/(1-θ ). Since, Maddison (1995) reports that the growth rate of per capita output in 
the United Kingdom has been around 1.3 percent per year over the last 100 years, we 
choose γ m=.0067.   
Table 1: Calibration Parameters 
Parameter Value  Observation  Comment 
a 1.0    Normalization 
β      .96  Asymptotic real 
interest rate of 5 
percent 
 
ε   .0001    
θ   .50    Intangible plus 
tangible capital 
Em 1.0   Normalization 
δ   .065    Standard 
γ m  .0064  1.3 % U.K per 




α   .7    Ag. Production 
Function estimates 
φ   .1    Hayami and Ruttan 
µ   .6    
γ a  .0074  1801 Ag. Employ. 
share of 35% 
reported by Kuznets 
(1966) 
 
Ea  .992 1950  Ag. 
Employment share 
of 5% reported by 
Kuznets (1966) 
 
  13 
 
  The capital share parameter, θ , is set to 0.50. This is a somewhat higher value than 
those typically used in the real business cycle research. This reflects two factors. First, 
recent revisions to capital stock series for the US suggest substantially higher capital 
stocks. (See Cooley and Prescott 19xx.).  Second, the higher value reflects the realization 
that intangible capital is also an important input in the production of non-agricultural 
goods, but is unmeasured in the national accounts.
10  The depreciation rate is set to 0.065. 
The final parameter in the non-agriculture technology is ε , which we set to 0.0001. The 
motivation for this choice is that the parameter must be non-zero so that the economy can 
accumulate capital starting with no capital, but it should be close to zero so that it does 
not affect the model’s predictions once the economy has a positive capital stock.    
    The parameters Ea and γ a are set so that the model matches UK agriculture 
employment shares in 1800 and 1950, which are reported by Kuznets (1966) to be 35 
percent and 5 percent respectively.   The implied value for Ea is .992 and the implied 
value for γ a is .0072.  The labor share parameter, α , in both the traditional agricultural 
technology and agricultural technology 1 is set to 0.70.  The capital share parameter, φ , 
and the labor share parameter, µ , in the modern agricultural technology 2 are set to .10 
and .60 respectively. Finally, the intertemporal substitution parameter, σ , is set to 1.0 and 
the subjective and the subjective time discount factor, β , is set to .96 so that the 
asymptotic annual interest rate is 5 percent. 
  Given our interpretation of capital in the manufacturing sector, there is an important 
adjustment that needs to be made when making comparisons between the model and the  14 
data.   This adjustment is necessitated by the fact that intangible capital goes unmeasured 
in the national income and product accounts.  Consequently, output in the model will not 
correspond to GDP.  This necessitates that we adjust output by subtracting off the amount 
of intangible capital investment when making comparisons with the data.    We do this 
very crudely in the following experiments by assuming that half of all investment is 
intangible.  This split is conservative relative to the estimates of Parente and Prescott 
(2000) that place the size of unmeasured investment to GDP between 25 and 50 
percent.
11   
    Figures 1-3 compare the time series generated by the model to UK data taken from 
Kuznets (1966).  According to this calibration, the first year in which resources are 
moved out of agriculture in the United Kingdom is 1728 and the first year in which 
agriculture starts using physical capital is 1763.   Despite the model’s simplicity, it 
matches the UK development and growth experience closely over the last 250 years.  
Figure 1 displays agriculture’s employment share. By the process of the calibration, the 
model trivially matches agriculture’s share of employment in 1800 and 1950. As can be 
seen, the model’s predictions for the period between 1820 and 1950, and the period after 
1950 are also very close to the actual data.  Figure 2 displays the path of per capita output 
over the 1820-1990 relative to the 1820 value. As can be seen the model matches the path 
of UK output fairly closely except for the period comprising the two World Wars. It is 
well known that the British economy grew well below trend values during the interwar 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 See Parente and Prescott (1994, 2000) for a formal discussion of the size of the intangible capital stock 
and its implications for total capital’s share. 
11 A more sophisticated method would compute the investment rates by decomposing Km(t) into both 
intangible and tangible components.  The split would depend critically on the share parameters for the two 
capital stocks, which could be pinned down by matching the model’s equilibrium to measured investments 
share of GDP.  15 
period, a phenomenon that is still subject to some debate and one that our calibration does 
not attempt to capture. Finally, Figure 3 displays agriculture’s share of output at each date 
measured in date t prices.   Here too the model, despite its rather simple structure, does a 
fairly good job at matching the decline in agriculture’s share of output.   
 
3.2 Implications for Cross-Country Income Differences 
In this section we explore the implications of cross-country productivity differences for 
the evolution of cross-country income differences and economic structure over time.  As 
already mentioned, we use these productivity differences as a reduced form catchall to 
reflect cross-country differences along a number of dimensions, including taxation, 
regulation, assignment and enforcement of property rights, institutions such as collective 
bargaining, and soil and climate conditions. Recall that the values of Ea and Em were 
normalized to one for the benchmark economy. In what follows we will refer to an 
economy as being distorted if either Ea or Em, or possibly both, is less than one, even 
though the difference may not result from policy.
12  
  Given our simplifying assumptions, a property of our model is that the date at which 
an economy industrializes is determined solely by the agriculture TFP parameter.  The 
value of the non-agricultural TFP parameter does not affect this date.  However, it does 
affect the rate at which the agriculture’s share of economic activity declines over the 
industrialization process. Thus, for the purpose of determining the model’s predictions 
for a country’s relative income, we begin by fixing Em at the benchmark value and 
consider how only differences in Ea affect an economy’s development path.  We then  16 
follow this experiment with ones that varies the value of Em keeping the value of Ea fixed 
in order to show how non-agricultural TFP affects the an economy’s rate of structural 
transformation and relative output.  
  Figure 4 depicts the path of the agricultural employment share for economies that 
start to industrialize in 1800, 1850, 1900, 1950, and 2000, and Table 2 reports the value 
of  Ea for which the model implies these industrialization dates together with the per 
capita GDP of the distorted economy relative to the benchmark economy at these dates.  
To reiterate, all economies in this experiment are assumed to have the same non-
agricultural TFP.  Relative income for each distorted economy is computed using year 
2000 prices from the benchmark economy. A country that begins to industrialize in the 
year 1800 has an agricultural TFP equal to 59 percent of the industrial leader, and an 
1800 per capita income equal to 40 percent of the leader.  Between 1800 and 2000, 
agriculture’s share of employment declines in this economy from 100 percent to 11 
percent.  In contrast, a country that begins to industrialize in 1950 has an agricultural TFP 
equal to 20 percent of the leader and a 1950 per capita income equal to 5 percent of the 
leader.  Between 1950 and 2000, agriculture’s share of employment declines from 100 
percent to 31 percent.  These values are typical of the employment shares and relative 
incomes observed among the poorest countries in the world over the second half of the 
twentieth century.
13   From a quantitative perspective, the longstanding idea in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 More precisely, these economies are only distorted relative to the benchmark. While we normalized the 
TFP values for the benchmark to equal one, this does not imply that this economy is not itself distorted in 
the sense that its policies result in TFP levels below what is technically achievable. 
13 The required differences in agricultural TFP in the model would be even smaller if capital were included 
as an input in agricultural technology 1.  
  17 
development literature that distortions that impact on the agricultural sector are a major 
reason that some countries are so poor is entirely plausible. 
 
Table 2: Agricultural TFP and Industrialization 
  
Date Ea Relative  Income 
1800 .59  40.0% 
1850 .41    21.0% 
1900 .28  11.0% 
1950 .19  5.5% 
2000   .14  2.9% 
 
  Although in our model productivity differentials in agriculture have important 
consequences for a country’s development, they have no consequences for its asymptotic 
income level.  To make this point perfectly clear we plot the path of per capita GDP over 
the period 1725-2050 for economies with distortions to agricultural activity that 
correspond to initial industrialization dates of 1750, 1850 and 1950.  These paths are 
shown in Figure 5. For transparency here, we assume no distortions to non-agricultural 
activity (i.e., Em = 1.0) so that all distorted economies, asymptotically, have an income 
equal to the benchmark economy.   Each country’s per capita output at each date is 
calculated relative to the benchmark economy using its prices in year 2000 as the base 
year.  
  There are a number of interesting implications that follow from Figure 5. One 
implication is that it is potentially quite misleading to interpret current cross-country 
differences in income as steady state differences.  Such an approach is taken by Parente, 
Rogerson, and Wright (2001), Parente and Prescott (1994, 2000), Chari, Kehoe, and 
McGrattan (1996), Schmitz (2001), Restuccia and Urrutia (1999) and Mankiw, Romer  18 
and Weil (1992) to name a few.   Another implication of Figure 5 is that countries that 
start the development process later will tend to grow faster than earlier entrants as they 
industrialize.  This prediction is broadly consistent with the finding of Parente and 
Prescott 1994, which shows that countries that achieved a certain level of income (say, 
e.g. $2,000) later in history were able to double their income (to $4,000) in a far shorter 
period than countries that achieved this level of income earlier in history.   
  Another significant point to be taken from the plots in Figure 5 concerns its 
implications for the speed of development once industrialization begins. As already 
noted, a country that begins to industrialize in 1950 would not be near its steady state 
output level until roughly one hundred years later. It is important to emphasize that this 
transition is much slower than one would observe if one simply started out with a small 
capital stock in the one-sector neoclassical growth model. The reason is that in our model 
labor is only moved slowly into the non-agricultural sector, whereas in the standard one-
sector neoclassical growth model the entire labor endowment is always in that sector. 
This matters a lot for the speed of convergence to the steady state.   
  One final important point to note in these simulations is how a productivity 
differential or “distortion” in only one sector can have such a large aggregate impact on 
an economy. In general, if only one activity is distorted, economic agents will devote 
fewer resources to that activity and more to the other activities, thereby lessening the 
impact of the distortion. However, in our model output from agriculture is necessary and 
hence the economy cannot substitute away from it. Moreover, if productivity in 
agriculture goes down, then there will actually be an increase in the number of resources 
devoted to that activity.   19 
  We now consider the impact of non-agricultural policy on the structural 
transformation process.  Although the non-agricultural TFP parameter does has no effect 
on the date at which industrialization begins it does affect the rate at which the 
agricultural sector declines.  Towards this end, we compute the equilibrium for a number 
of economies all of which begin the process of industrialization in 1950 but which differ 
in non-agricultural TFP.  The values of Em we consider are .50, .25 and .10.   Figure 6 
shows agriculture’s share of employment for these distorted economies and Figure 7 
shows relative per capita GDP for these economies over the 1950-2050.  Per capita GDP 
in date t is expressed relative to date t per capita GDP for the benchmark economy using 
year 2000 prices in the benchmark economy.  
  Figure 6 shows that differences in non-agricultural TFP can have large effects on the 
rate of decline on agriculture’s share of employment.  For instance, agriculture’s share of 
employment in the economy with Em=.10 reaches 50 percent 32 years later and reaches 
25 percent 49 years compared to the economy with Em=.50.  We note that the first date in 
which the agricultural technology using capital uses is 1962, 1979 and 2080 in the three 
economies.  
  In terms of relative outputs, differences in non-agricultural TFP have very different 
implications for development paths.  For the economy with Em = .10 relative per capita 
GDP continues to fall over the industrialization process: for the economy with Em = 0.25, 
relative per capita GDP does not change much over the industrialization process: and for 
the economy with Em = 0.50 relative per capita GDP increases.  We note that 
asymptotically, the per capita GDP of these three economies relative to the benchmark 




  To the extent that most poor countries in the world have started to industrialize, we 
can ask whether the disparity in incomes between the richest and poorest countries will 
increase or decrease over the next century.  Whether the poorest countries continue to 
lose ground depends on how low non-agricultural TFP is in those countries.  According 
to the model, if non-agricultural productivity is less than 25 percent the U.K. level, then 
the poorest countries in the world will get poorer over the next century. TFP for a number 
of manufacturing and service industries are estimated Bailey (1993), Bailey and Gerbach 
(1995), and Bailey and Solow (2001) for a set of rich and middle- income countries.  
These studies suggest that TFP in manufacturing and service industries differs a lot 
across rich countries.  Although these studies do not cover the poorest countries in the 
world, (the poorest nation covered in these studies is Brazil), they do not rule out a 
further widening in income disparities over the next century. 
 
3.2 Productivity Increases in Agriculture and Manufacturing 
We now turn to the question of the importance of reforms in agriculture and in non-
agriculture on an economy’s development path.  We begin by examining the effect of a 
one-time increase in agricultural TFP on an economy’s development path.  More 
specifically, we ask what would be the impact over the 1950-2000 period of a one-time 
increase in productivity in agriculture equal to 100 percent in 1950?    We emphasize that 
there is a real world basis for this question. A substantial literature describes the Green 
Revolution of the period 1960-2000 in developing countries. (See, for example, Evenson  21 
and Gollin 2002.) Crop-level estimates of yield gain from the Green Revolution range 
from 20 percent to 100 percent.
14  
  Figure 8 shows the relative income of the distorted economy, both with and without 
the productivity innovation.  Without the innovation, Ea = .19.  This is essentially the 
value of the non-agricultural TFP parameter that generates a starting date of 1950.  With 
the innovation Ea = .38. In both cases Em = .25. The results are striking. With the 
innovation, income relative to the benchmark economy in 1975 is equal to 18 percent. 
Without the innovation, income is equal to 8 percent of the benchmark economy’s 
income.  These differences decrease over time; in the year 2000, relative incomes of the 
distorted and the reform economies are 16 percent and 23 percent respectively.  And by 
2050, the relative income of both economies is roughly equal. Improvements in 
agricultural productivity, therefore, can have large impacts on cross-country income 
differences.
15 Equivalently, though we have not reported the growth rates of the two 
                                                 
14 . The Green Revolution is the term used to describe the application of modern 
(conventional) plant breeding techniques to the problems of developing countries. 
Although the biggest gains of the Green Revolution occurred in wheat and rice, advances 
have been made in almost all crops. Since 1960, more than 8,000 modern crop varieties 
have been released by breeding programs in the developing world.  Crop-level estimates 
of yield gain from the Green Revolution range from 20 percent to 100 percent. According 
to Evenson (1999), the Green Revolution has contributed significantly to growth in 
agricultural TFP, which has increased at an annual rate of more than 1 percent over long 
time periods. Hence, this type of experiment is relevant for assessing the consequences of 
this type of change on the cross-country income distribution.  In addition to technology 
changes, a number of counties have improved agricultural productivity through major 
changes in institutions – such as land reform designed to let individual farmers gain title 
to the land that they work. By improving the incentives of farmers, land reform can lead 
to dramatic increases in productivity. Taiwan offers a useful example of this. A major 
land reform in 1952 altered the incentives for smallholders to farm and to invest in land 
improvements. This land reform reinforced changes in technology and encouraged the rapid 
diffusion of modern rice varieties. 
 
15 The experiment just considered might well understate the true effects of technological innovation in the 
agricultural sector for the reason that the assumed innovation is associated with a one-time change in the  22 
economies over time, it is clear that the economy with the innovation grows a lot faster 
over the period 1950-2000, implying that a productivity innovation can have substantial 
effects on growth rates over the short and medium run.  
    There are large differences in the size of agricultures share of employment between 
the two economies subsequent to 1950.   We highlight these differences in Figure 9. In 
1975, the economy with the innovation has xx percent of its labor force in agriculture, 
and in 2000 this value is down xx percent.  In comparison, the economy without the 
innovation has an agriculture share of employment of xx percent in 1975 and xx percent 
in 2000.  Larger increases in agricultural productivity result in larger decreases in 
agricultural employment.   
  We now consider how an increase in non-agricultural TFP affects an economy’s 
development path, in particular, agriculture’s share of employment and relative GDP per 
capita.  Like the unexpected and permanent increase in the agricultural TFP parameter, an 
unexpected and permanent increase in the non-agricultural TFP will have consequences 
for the economy’s development path in the short run.  However, it also has consequences 
to the economy’s development in the long run.   
  We attempt to highlight these short-run and long-run consequences by conducting the 
following experiment.  Namely, we fix Ea = .19 and determine the value of Em so that 
year 1985 relative GDP is the same as year 1985 relative output for the economy with the 
permanent and unexpected increase in agricultural TFP in 1950.  The implied value for 
Em is .37.  This represents a 50 percent increase in non-agricultural TFP relative to the 
economy that does not undergo any 1950 reforms and the economy that undergoes a 1950 
                                                                                                                                                 
level of productivity. As a matter of fact, introductions of new seed varieties were accompanied by changes 
in TFP agricultural growth.   23 
agricultural reform.     We include in Figure 8 the path of relative GDP for the economy 
that undergoes a 1950 non-agricultural reform.   Asymptotically, the economy that 
undergoes the non-agricultural reform will have a relative income 14 percent of the 
benchmark economy’s level whereas the economies that do not undergo non-agricultural 
reforms will be 6.25 percent the benchmark economy’s level.   
    There is really nothing special about the year 1985.  We could have chosen the 
value for Em so that 1975 relative GDPs are the same across countries.  This would imply 
a larger increase in non-agricultural TFP, and hence a larger asymptotic difference in 
relative outputs.  To attain the same level of per capita GDP in 1975 as the economy that 
undergoes an agricultural reform, the non-agricultural TFP parameter must be .43 in the 
non-agricultural reform economy.   Asymptotically, this country will have a per capita 
GDP that is 18 percent of the benchmark level. 
    Although these economies have the same per capita GDP in 1985, they look very 
different in terms of their structures.    Figure 9 makes this point by including the plot of 
agriculture’s share of employment for the economy that undergoes a non-agricultural 
reform in 1950.    Agriculture’s share of employment between the distorted and the non-
agricultural reform economy are not much different over the 1950 to 2050 period.   They 
are far smaller for the economy that undergoes the agricultural reform.   
  The relation between agriculture’s share of f employment is a lot less clear. If we use 
each country’s date t price of the manufacturing good to calculate agriculture’s share of 
output, the output shares mimic the employment shares. This is shown in Figure 10. If 
however, we use a common price to value the manufacturing good we see that 
agriculture’s share of output for the non-agricultural reform economy is very similar to  24 
the agricultural reform economy.  These results are a consequence of the manufacturing 
good being relatively cheap in the non-agricultural reform economy. 
 
4. Empirical Support 
Underlying all of the above results is the implication that improvements in agricultural 
productivity allow resources to be released to other activities. Before going further with 
our analysis it is instructive to ask what the empirical support is for this proposition. In 
this section we document three facts about the agricultural transformation. First, in most 
poor countries, large amounts of labor and land are devoted to the production of basic 
foods for domestic consumption – in other words, to meeting subsistence needs. Second, 
increases in the productivity of the agricultural sector are associated with a structural 
transformation: the shifting of resources away from agriculture and into non-agriculture. 
Third, this structural transformation appears to play a critical role in economic growth: 
productivity gains in agriculture and the movement of resources into non-agriculture 
together account for the majority of growth in aggregate incomes. We consider these 
three facts in turn. 
Subsistence needs 
In most poor countries, agriculture accounts for very large fractions of employment 
and value added. Some agriculture is devoted to producing non-food export crops are 
important in some places. But in general, most of the land and labor in poor countries are 
devoted to food production – and specifically, to meeting the subsistence needs of the 
population.  25 
Table 3 at the end of the paper shows the extent to which resources in the 
developing world are allocated to meeting subsistence needs. For the 97 countries in the 
data, in 1999, about 65 percent of arable land was devoted to grains, roots, and tubers.
16 
Of the resulting production, almost all was devoted to domestic consumption: only a 
handful of developing countries were net exporters of grain or root crops (Argentina, 
Guyana, India, Paraguay, Thailand, Uruguay, and Vietnam).
17 Of these, only Argentina 
exported more than a quarter of its grain production (FAOSTAT 2001).  
Thus, in today’s poor countries, most of the resources in agriculture are used for 
meeting domestic food needs. The resources required are large, relative to the aggregate 
economy.  
Productivity growth and the agricultural transformation  
Early development economists were uncertain about the forces driving the 
agricultural transformation. One view, articulated by Lewis 1965, among others, was that 
the agricultural labor force was essentially a residual pool of effectively unemployed 
labor. In this view, the agricultural transformation was assumed to result from the 
emergence of a dynamic non-agricultural sector that would accumulate capital and 
perhaps bring improved technology.  
An alternative view, identifiable in Schultz (1964) as well as in Johnston and 
Mellor (1961), was that productivity improvements within the agriculture sector were 
                                                 
16 The data include all countries classified by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
as developing countries for which arable land in 1999 was greater than 100,000 ha. The major countries 
missing from the data are the countries of the former Soviet Union, along with some small island countries 
and some small oil producers. 
 
Note that it is possible for some arable land to be cropped more than once per year. This is why some 
countries show more than 100 percent of the arable land planted to grain, roots, and tubers. 
17 A number of countries from the former Soviet Union are major exporters of grain, including Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan.  26 
critical to the agricultural transformation and would eventually – almost paradoxically – 
lead to the diminishing importance of the agricultural sector. 
Forty years later, it seems fairly clear that the second view is more consistent with 
the data.
18 On average, countries that have succeeded in increasing productivity in 
agriculture have experienced relatively sharp declines in agriculture’s share of GDP. In 
other words, growth in agricultural productivity has been associated with a diminishing 
role for agriculture. This result is fairly robust to the ways in which we measure 
agricultural productivity, and it mirrors results reported by Timmer (1988), among others. 
Using data on a set of 62 countries defined as developing by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, and for which all relevant data 
were available, we can examine the relationship between agricultural productivity growth 
and structural change. Table 4 reports the results of an OLS regression on the data, for the 
1960-90 period. The results show a negative and significant relationship between the 
change in agriculture’s share of employment and the change in agricultural output per 
person.
19  A similar (stronger) result obtains if we use agricultural output per worker on 
the right-hand side, although this variable by construction is linked with agriculture’s 
share of employment.
20  
The implication is that countries experiencing increases in agricultural productivity 
are able to release labor and other resources from agriculture into other sectors of the 
economy. This finding is particularly important because the data suggest that in most 
                                                 
18 See the survey of Rosenszweig (1988) for persuasive defense of this. 
19 Agriculture’s share of employment is a useful measure of agriculture’s importance in economic activity. 
The other commonly reported measure – agriculture’s share of GDP – is directly related to increases in 
productivity and thus is a less attractive measure of agriculture’s importance in the economy. 
20 This also supports the notion that the increase in agricultural productivity is not occurring simply because 
unproductive labor is being removed from the sector.  27 
poor countries, output per worker in non-agriculture is far higher than in agriculture. This 
means that a shift of workers from agriculture to non-agriculture increases average 
productivity in the economy. For example, shifting a worker from agriculture to non-
agriculture in 1960 would have tripled his or her output in Korea or Malaysia; it would 
have increased it by a factor of nine in Thailand. 
Agricultural productivity growth and economic growth 
Productivity growth in agriculture thus has two major effects on economic growth. 
First, since agriculture is the largest sector in most poor countries, increases in 
agricultural productivity have a big direct impact on aggregate output. Second, by 
stimulating the movement of resources into non-agriculture, productivity growth in 
agriculture can help to raise the average productivity of the economy. 
The first effect is visible in the data of Table 4, included at the end of the paper, 
which reports growth rates in agriculture, non-agriculture, and per capita GDP for the 
1960-90 period. For most of the countries that grew the fastest in terms of real per capita 
GDP, agricultural productivity growth over this period was more rapid than non-
agricultural productivity growth. This reflects, in part, the large initial size of the 
agricultural sector and the difficulty of achieving high growth in GDP per capita without 
gains in agriculture. 
The second important effect of productivity growth in agriculture is to release 
workers to the non-agriculture sector. As noted above, the movement of labor from 
agriculture into non-agriculture is a critical part of the growth story.  
Thus, the data support the idea – somewhat unconventional, in terms of the current 
growth literature – that improvements in agricultural productivity play an important role  28 
in stimulating economic growth. To formalize this idea, consider a decomposition of 
economic growth into three components: growth within agriculture, growth within non-
agriculture, and growth attributable to sectoral shifts. Growth within agriculture is simply 
the growth in output per worker within agriculture, weighted by agriculture’s share of 
GDP in the initial period. Similarly, growth within non-agriculture is the growth in output 
per worker in non-agriculture, weighted by the initial share of non-agriculture in GDP. 
Together, these two measures show how much growth could have been expected if the 
sizes of the two sectors had remained constant, and the only source of growth had been 
improvements in productivity within each sector. In actuality, however, there is a third 
source of growth – from sectoral shifts that reallocated workers from low productivity 
sectors to high productivity ones. 
This decomposition is presented in Table 5. For 50 of the countries in the data, 
agricultural productivity growth and sectoral shifts were together more important 
contributors to the growth of real per capita GDP than is non-agricultural growth. These 
countries include Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and China (though not Korea or 
Singapore). In slightly more than half of the countries – 36 out of 62 – agricultural 
productivity growth was higher than non-agricultural productivity growth. If one 
averages over the sample, one finds that the contribution of agricultural growth, non-
agricultural growth, and sectoral shifts are 30 percent, 20 percent and 50 percent 
respectively. From this decomposition, we conclude that agricultural productivity growth, 
along with the ensuing sectoral shifts in employment, is an important source of economic 
growth. 
  29 
5. Conclusion  
We have shown in a rather simple model that low agricultural productivity can delay 
industrialization process for a long period of time. By delaying the industrialization 
process, such policies result in a country’s per capita income falling far behind the leader.  
Improvements in agricultural productivity can hasten the start of industrialization, and by 
doing so can have large effects on a country’s relative income.  Such changes will, in the 
short-run have a larger impact than a comparable change in non-agriculture. Ultimately, 
however, the nature of non-agricultural policy determines a country’s position to the 
leader. While we have painted a picture of development that uses fairly broad brush 
strokes, we believe the important message that emerges is that greater attention to the 
determinants of productivity in agriculture will greatly enhance our understanding of 
cross- country differences in income.  30 
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Table 3: Regression results: Changes in agricultural productivity and 
their relationship to changes in agriculture’s share of employment, 1960-
1990, for 62 developing countries. 
        
Dependent Variable: Change in Log of Agriculture's Share of Employment  
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R  0.423      
R Square  0.179      
Adjusted R Square  0.137      
Standard Error  0.093      
Observations 62       
Significance – F   0.009      
        
ANOVA        
   Df  SS  MS  F 
Regression 3  0.109  0.036  4.218 
Residual 58  0.501  0.009   
Total  61  0.610      
        
   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t  Stat  P-value 
Intercept -0.052  0.035  -1.479  0.145 
Change in log ag output per person  -0.150  0.072  -2.076  0.042 
Ag Output per Person 1970  -1.6E-4  8E-05  -1.984  0.052 
Dummy: 1960 data  -0.075  0.024  -3.018  0.004 
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Table 4: Variables relating to the structural transformation of agriculture, 62 

































Singapore  1.068  1.081  0.074  0.070 2.035 1.074   
Korea  Rep  1.055  1.059  0.613  0.432 2.938 1.071   
Malaysia  1.030  1.046  0.633  0.359 3.295 1.046   
Indonesia  1.039  1.015  0.748  0.196 2.800 1.045   
Lesotho  1.077  1.010  0.473  0.073 0.295 1.045   
Thailand  1.026  1.020  0.837  0.196 8.954 1.042   
Jordan  1.026  1.059  0.498  0.347 3.767 1.041   
Syria  1.000  1.073  0.607  0.275 5.087 1.037   
China  1.011  1.039  0.830  0.110 16.945 1.037   
Brazil  1.017  1.030  0.552  0.319 4.747 1.035   
Congo, Dem R  0.991  1.057  0.793  0.115  17.755  1.033   
Egypt  1.010  1.025  0.658  0.255 3.779 1.032   
Cameroon  0.991  1.019  0.892  0.195 12.317 1.031   
Nigeria  1.018  1.015  0.732  0.301 1.543 1.029   
Ecuador  1.015  1.015  0.594  0.262 3.560 1.029  1970-87 
Algeria  0.994  1.073  0.710  0.449 10.344 1.028   
Morocco  1.002  1.037  0.731  0.284 7.487 1.028   
Colombia  1.013  1.027  0.521  0.255 2.380 1.025   
Paraguay  1.019  1.026  0.542  0.153 2.066 1.025   
Dominican  Rp  1.005  1.022  0.636  0.388 2.992 1.024   
Gabon  0.996  0.989  0.852  0.337 12.127 1.023   
Pakistan  1.025  1.012  0.658  0.140 2.236 1.023   
Sri  Lanka  1.015  1.018  0.566  0.081 2.811 1.023   
Mauritius  1.036  1.068  0.396  0.229 2.695 1.022  1960-89 
Fiji  Islands  1.023  1.008  0.596  0.142 2.638 1.022   
Rwanda  1.029  0.975  0.947  0.030 7.483 1.022  1960-89 
Togo  1.012  1.009  0.801  0.145 3.312 1.019  1960-88 
Trinidad  Tob 1.013  0.986  0.217  0.106 2.058 1.017   
India  1.012  1.009  0.754  0.114 3.706 1.017  1970-90 
Costa  Rica  1.009  1.023  0.512  0.251 2.520 1.016   
Philippines 1.005 1.021 0.636 0.178  5.074  1.015   
Kenya  1.000  1.009  0.879  0.083 11.719 1.015   
Honduras  0.993  1.011  0.725  0.311 4.406 1.012   
Gambia  0.993  1.000  0.892  0.072 12.838 1.012   
Burkina Faso  1.014  0.995  0.918  -0.006  13.780  1.010  1960-89 
Malawi  0.988  1.011  0.936  0.070 14.671 1.010   
Guatemala  0.993  1.007  0.661  0.137 4.174 1.010   
Zimbabwe  0.989  1.009  0.808  0.126 16.015 1.010  1960-89 

































Chile  1.008  1.027  0.303  0.115 4.177 1.007   
Uruguay  1.009  0.989  0.213  0.071 0.891 1.007  1960-89 
Jamaica  1.003  1.014  0.415  0.169 6.104 1.007   
Mali  1.002  0.997  0.938  0.080 6.518 1.006   
Argentina  0.990  0.996  0.206  0.085 1.787 1.006   
El  Salvador  1.003  0.997  0.618  0.254 1.978 1.005   
Peru  0.998  0.978  0.523  0.167 4.061 1.005   
Burundi  1.032  1.013  0.947  0.030 6.046 1.004   
GuineaBissau  0.971  1.012  0.912  0.060 8.492 1.004   
Senegal  0.992  0.998  0.839  0.071 17.071 1.002   
Papua N Guin  0.972  0.978  0.896  0.104  10.600  1.001   
Mauritania  0.953  1.003  0.921  0.369 12.435 1.001   
Uganda  0.963  1.004  0.927  0.082 11.850 0.999   
Venezuela  0.988  1.036  0.334  0.214 9.947 0.996   
Ghana  0.992  1.006  0.633  0.040 2.499 0.995   
Benin  0.968  0.998  0.850  0.215 6.629 0.995   
Sierra  Leone 0.950  1.006  0.813  0.139 7.334 0.995   
Cent Afr Rep  0.948  1.007  0.934  0.132  14.921  0.995   
Guyana  0.976  1.021  0.377  0.158 1.700 0.993   
Nicaragua  0.948  1.010  0.630  0.344 3.161 0.990   
Zambia  0.962  1.007  0.846  0.099 28.722 0.990   
Madagascar  0.953  0.991  0.862  0.080 16.639 0.980  1960-86 
Chad  0.941  0.975  0.955  0.123 30.765 0.971     
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Singapore 0.068  0.000  0.006 
Korea Rep  0.045  0.011  0.015 
Malaysia 0.022  0.013  0.011 
Indonesia 0.018  0.008  0.020 
Lesotho 0.046  0.004  -0.005 
Thailand 0.010  0.013  0.020 
Jordan 0.022  0.009  0.010 
Syria 0.000  0.024  0.014 
China 0.003  0.028  0.006 
Brazil 0.013  0.007  0.015 
Congo, Dem R  -0.003  0.038  -0.003 
Egypt 0.006  0.010  0.016 
Cameroon -0.003  0.013  0.020 
Nigeria 0.010  0.006  0.012 
Ecuador 0.010  0.005  0.013 
Algeria -0.004  0.019  0.013 
Morocco 0.001  0.017  0.010 
Colombia 0.009  0.007  0.008 
Paraguay 0.011  0.010  0.003 
Dominican Rp  0.004  0.006  0.014 
Gabon -0.002  -0.006  0.031 
Pakistan 0.012  0.006  0.005 
Sri Lanka  0.008  0.009  0.007 
Mauritius 0.030  0.011  -0.019 
Fiji Islands  0.012  0.004  0.006 
Rwanda  0.002 -0.023 0.043 
Togo 0.004  0.006  0.009 
Trinidad  Tob  0.012 -0.002 0.007 
India 0.004  0.006  0.007 
Costa Rica  0.007  0.006  0.003 
Philippines 0.003 0.010 0.003 
Kenya 0.000  0.007  0.008 
Honduras -0.004  0.004  0.012 
Gambia -0.001  0.000  0.013 
Burkina  Faso  0.001 -0.005 0.014 
Malawi -0.002  0.010  0.002 
Guatemala -0.003  0.004 0.009 
Zimbabwe -0.003  0.006 0.007 
Bangladesh -0.006 0.004  0.010  37 
Chile 0.007  0.005  -0.004 
Uruguay  0.008 -0.002 0.001 
Jamaica 0.002  0.003  0.002 
Mali  0.000 -0.002 0.009 
Argentina -0.009  0.000  0.015 
El  Salvador 0.002 -0.001 0.004 
Peru -0.001  -0.008  0.013 
Burundi 0.003  0.012  -0.011 
GuineaBissau -0.004  0.010  -0.002 
Senegal -0.002  -0.001  0.005 
Papua N Guin  -0.006  -0.018  0.025 
Mauritania -0.021 0.002 0.020 
Uganda -0.006  0.004  0.001 
Venezuela -0.010  0.004 0.002 
Ghana -0.003  0.004  -0.005 
Benin -0.012  -0.002  0.008 
Sierra Leone  -0.016  0.004  0.008 
Cent Afr Rep  -0.010  0.006  -0.001 
Guyana -0.019  0.005  0.007 
Nicaragua -0.037  0.003  0.025 
Zambia -0.010  0.005  -0.006 
Madagascar -0.010 -0.007 -0.003 
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Figure 4: Agriculture's Share of Employment 




























  42 
Figure 5: Relative Per Capita GDP 
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Figure 6: Agriculture's Share of Employment 
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Figure7: Relative Per Capita GDP 
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Figure 9: Agriculture's Share of Employment
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Figure 10: Agricultures Share of GDP Following Reforms 
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Figure 11: Agriculture Shares of GDP following Reform 
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